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The various neurocognitive processes contributing to the sense of body ownership have
been investigated extensively in healthy participants, but studies in neurological patients
can shed unique light into such phenomena. Here, we aimed to investigate whether visual
capture by a fake hand (without any synchronous or asynchronous tactile stimulation)
affects body ownership in a group of hemiplegic patients with or without disturbed
sensation of limb ownership (DSO) following damage to the right hemisphere. We recruited
31 consecutive patients, including seven patients with DSO. The majority of our patients
(64.5% overall and up to 86% of the patients with DSO) experienced strong feelings of
ownership over a rubber hand within 15 sec following mere visual exposure, which
correlated with the degree of proprioceptive deficits across groups and in the DSO group.
Using voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping analysis, we were able to identify lesions
associated with this pathological visual capture effect in a selective fronto-parietal
network, including significant voxels (p < .05) in the frontal operculum and the inferior
frontal gyrus. By contrast, lesions associated with DSO involved more posterior lesions,
including the right temporoparietal junction and a large area of the supramarginal gyrus,
and to a lesser degree the middle frontal gyrus. Thus, this study suggests that our sense of
ownership includes dissociable mechanisms of multisensory integration.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).l and Health Psychology Research Department, 1-19 Torrington Place, London,
. Fotopoulou).
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c o r t e x 8 7 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 7 4e1 8 5 1751. IntroductionThe term confabulation typically refers to the production of
false memories in the context of neurological pathology.
However, it has also been used more broadly to describe the
production of unintentionally false statements about one's
self or the world, beyond the domain of memory (DeLuca,
2000; Feinberg & Roane, 1997; Hirstein, 2005). In this
broader sense, a clear conceptual distinction between
confabulation, delusion and anosognosia (unawareness of
illness) becomes harder. While maintaining these separate
terms therefore has conceptual advantages (Kopelman, 1999),
considering confabulation in parallel to other similar symp-
toms allows for cross-fertilisation between studies on such
phenomena (see Fotopoulou, 2010; Hirstein, 2005; Langdon &
Turner, 2010).
In the present article, we focus on certain ‘somatic de-
lusions’, as they typically occur following right hemisphere
stroke. First, patients may show ‘disturbed sensation of limb
ownership’ (DSO; Baier & Karnath, 2008), including ‘asoma-
tognosia’, when ownership, or even the existence of a limb is
denied. Some patients further present with a positive (in the
Jacksonian sense; 1932) variant termed somatoparaphrenia,
whereby disownership is accompanied by delusional beliefs,
such as personification of the affected limb and/or attributing
it to someone else (Gerstmann, 1942; see also Feinberg &
Venneri, 2014; Vallar & Ronchi, 2009, for reviews). Further-
more, DSO can co-occur with an apparent inability to
acknowledge or recognise one's contralesional paralysis, so-
called anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP; Babinski, 1914; see
Fotopoulou, 2014, 2015 for reviews).Whether anosognosia and
body ownership disturbances are caused by common under-
lying neural and psychological deficits or whether they
represent independent disorders, remains debated (e.g.,
compare Baier & Karnath, 2008 and Gandola et al., 2012).
Importantly, these disorders offer a unique window of
insight into the neurophysiological mechanisms by which the
body is consciously experienced (body awareness). These
mechanisms have received significant scientific interest in
recent decades, including the development of several psy-
chophysical and virtual reality paradigms that can generate
subjective, somatic illusions in healthy volunteers (see Kilteni,
Maselli, Kording, & Slater, 2015 for a review). For instance,
pioneering work on illusory ownership of a fake hand, i.e., the
rubber-hand illusion (RHI; Botvinik & Cohen, 1998), has
emphasised the contribution of multisensory integration, i.e.,
the integration of sensory signals from differentmodalities, to
the sense of body ownership (Holmes & Spence, 2005; Stein &
Standford, 2008).
Vision has been one of the most studied modalities in this
paradigm (Kilteni et al., 2015), however, these effects tend to
be considered in the context of visuo-tactile integration. Only
a few RHI studies have measured subjective feelings of hand
ownership followingmere visual exposure to a fake hand, i.e.,
independently of tactile manipulations. Some of these studies
reported no effects (e.g., Longo, Schu¨u¨r, Kammers, Tsakiris, &
Haggard, 2008; see also Rohde, Di Luca, & Ernst, 2011 for
anecdotal evidence), while others found that ‘mere vision’conditions can change feelings of ownership for the fake hand
(Pavani, Spence, & Driver, 2000; Farne, Pavani, Meneghello, &
Ladavas, 2000; Guimmarra, Georgiou-Karistianis, Nicholls,
Gibson, & Bradshaw, 2010; Tieri, Tidoni, Pavone, & Aglioti,
2015a, 2015b). It should be stressed that the conclusions of
these studies are based on mere ‘visual’ conditions, rather
than on negative findings from the comparison of synchro-
nous versus asynchronous tactile stimulation; a comparison
whose interpretation seems more complex than initially
thought (e.g., Rohde et al., 2011). Moreover, while it is well-
established that under certain circumstances, conflicting vi-
sual feedback from fake, or virtual, or visually misplaced
hands via mirrors and wedge prisms (see Holmes & Spence,
2006 for review), can override proprioception (the so-called
visual capture of proprioception), recent studies have estab-
lished that position sense recalibrations can be dissociated
from the sense of body ownership during the RHI (Abdulkarim
& Ehrsson, 2016; Rohde et al., 2011; see also Makin, Holmes, &
Ehrsson, 2008 for an early review). Thus, the relation between
visual capture of proprioception and subjective ownership
feelings remains unclear during ‘mere vision’ conditions. We
will heuristically call this possibility, ‘visual capture of
ownership’ (hereafter reffered to as VOC; ‘visual ownership
capture’ for brevity).
To this end, the present study will focus on VOC by a fake
hand (independently of any synchronous or asynchronous
tactile stimulation). To the best of our knowledge, the neural
mechanisms of VOC remain unexplored in healthy partici-
pants, as existing functional neuroimaging studies have not
included ‘mere vision’ conditions (see Makin et al., 2008;
Tsakiris, 2010 for reviews). Moreover, such functional neuro-
imaging studies can only establish correlations, while studies
in brain damaged patients can be informative regarding the
causal role of some brain areas and their connections. Un-
fortunately, the relation between experimentally-induced
conditions of VOC and neuropsychological DSO has not been
systematically explored. Moreover, comparisons between the
few existing studies are hindered by the vast differences in the
conceptualisation and measurement of the observed
phenomena.
Indeed, in a series of studies, Berti and her colleagues, have
proposed that some right hemisphere patients show what
they describe as ‘a monothematic delusion of body owner-
ship’, which relies on observing another person's hand in
one's contralesional (affected) side and in egocentric, body-
congruent perspective (Garbarini et al., 2013, 2014). However,
the phenomenon may be more general and complex than
these studies suggest. In a previous study involving eight
hemiplegic patients with right hemisphere lesions, including
one patients with DSO (Fotopoulou et al., 2008), all patients
immediately accepted as their own a stationary rubber hand
placed congruently with their own left hand. Thus, VOC may
be a pervasive phenomenon following right hemisphere
damage and it may also be dissociable from DSO (see also
Zeller, Gross, Bartsch, Johansen-Berg, & Classen, 2011; Jen-
kinson, Haggard, Ferreira, & Fotopoulou, 2013; Bolognini,
Ronchi, Casati, Fortis, & Vallar, 2014 for further dissociations
between DSO and the classic RHI). Indeed, this possibility is
supported by the only case study in the literature that applied
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with DSO following damage to the right-hemisphere (van
Stralen, van Zandvoort, Kappelle, & Dijkerman, 2013). Even
though a ‘mere vision’ condition was not tested, the patient
experienced feelings of ownership over the affected hand, in
conditions of both synchronous and asynchronous tactile
stimulation.
Importantly, this possibility raises a paradox, which to
our knowledge has not been addressed in the literature: if
patients with DSO are willing to accept as theirs a realistic
hand that is visually presented in a congruent position as
their own hand, why do they deny the ownership of their
own hand when viewed under similar conditions? Such re-
sults could only be explained if some other bottom-up defi-
cits (e.g., hypoesthesia), or damage to top-downmechanisms
that would normally allow the integration of such signals
with pre-existing models of the body (see Tsakiris, 2010),
prevented the patient's own hand from being recognised as
one's own.
Although we could not quantify and examine all these
possibilities in the present study, our main aim was to sys-
tematically assess for the first time whether patients with
right-hemisphere damage and DSO show VOC by a fake
hand (without any synchronous or asynchronous tactile
stimulation). To this end, we recruited 31 patients with
recent right-hemisphere strokes, including seven patients
with DSO. Furthermore, using lesion mapping procedures
(i.e., the voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM)
approach; Bates et al., 2003), we examined the lesions asso-
ciated with (1) VOC versus failure of VOC and (2) proprio-
ceptive deficits in our sample, as a way to characterise the
relation between such deficits, own hand ownership and
rubber hand ownership.
Based on previous case reports (Fotopoulou et al., 2008;
van Stralen et al., 2013), we expected that (1) visual cap-
ture would elicit ownership of the rubber hand in the ma-
jority of our patients (irrespective of diagnostic group) and
particularly those with greater proprioceptive deficits. As far
as neural mechanisms are concerned, we expected: (a)
proprioceptive deficits to be associated with lesions in pri-
mary somatosensory areas in the parietal cortex; (b) VOC to
be associated with the involvement of further, multi-modal
areas in the posterior parietal cortex and mostly in the
ventral premotor cortex and the posterior insular cortex, as
these brain regions have been linked to ownership feelings
of fake hands in previous functional imaging studies on the
RHI (Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Tsakiris, Hesse,
Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007); (c) By contrast, failures of VOC
should be associated with sparing of such cortical areas (see
also Zeller et al., 2011 who only found lesions in the white
matter connections of this area), in the sense that these
patients would show either less proprioceptive deficits, and/
or greater monitoring of proprioceptive errors during
multisensory integration conditions. Finally, (d) DSO was
expected to be selectively associated, with additional
cortical lesions to the parietal cortex, such as the tempor-
oparietal junction (TPJ) that can been linked with ‘filtering’
signals from the body in relation to pre-existing body
models (Tsakiris, 2010).2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Thirty-one patients with right hemisphere lesions due to an
ischaemic or haemorrhagic stroke were consecutively
recruited from three acute stroke units in London, UK, using
the following criteria: (1) unilateral right-hemisphere lesion as
confirmed by clinical neuroimaging (CT or MRI), (2) contrale-
sional hemiplegia, (3) <4 months from symptom onset, (4) no
previous history of neurological or psychiatric illness, (5) >7
years of education, (6) no medication with severe cognitive or
mood side-effects, (7) no severe language impairment that
precluded completion of the study assessments; (8) willing-
ness and availability to participate in the study.
DSOwere evaluated using amodified version of the Cutting
questionnaire (Cutting, 1978). The assessment began by dis-
tracting the patient, placing their left arm in their right visual
field and asking “What is this?”, “Is this your hand?” and “Does
it feel like it belongs to you?”. If the patient denied ownership
of the arm, theywere then asked, “Does it feel like it belongs to
anyone else?” and “Anyone in particular?”. The questionnaire
was scored on a 3-point scale (2 ¼ asomatognosia and/or
somatoparaphrenia; 1 ¼ partial acknowledgment of body
ownership; 0 ¼ full acknowledgment). Patients with a score of
2 on the modified Cutting questionnaire were categorised as
DSO.
Patients were examined for AHP via a method previously
described (Besharati et al., 2014; Fotopoulou et al., 2008), based
on the Berti interview (Berti, Ladavas, & Della Corte, 1996) and
the Feinberg scale (Feinberg, Roane, & Ali, 2000). The Berti
interview, which includes specific questions regarding motor
ability (e.g., “Can you move your left arm?”) and ‘confrontation’
questions (e.g., “Please touchmy handwith your left hand; have you
done it?”), is scored on a 3-point scale (2 ¼ denial of motor
impairment and failure to reach examiner hand; 1 ¼ denial of
motor impairment but admits failure to reach examiner hand;
0 ¼ full acknowledgment of motor impairment). The Feinberg
scale, used as a secondarymeasure of awareness, consists of 10
items including general self-report items (e.g., “Do you have any
weakness anywhere?”) and task-related items (e.g., “Please try and
move your left arm for me; did you move it”). Each itemwas scored
on a 3-point scale (1 ¼ complete unawareness; .5 ¼ partially
unaware; 0¼ completely aware) to produce an overall score out
of 10 (10 ¼ completely unaware; 0 ¼ completely aware). Pa-
tients scoring 1 or 2 on the Berti interview and at least 4 on the
Feinberg scale were categorised as AHP. DSO and AHP assess-
ments were conducted during the general clinical and cogni-
tive assessment (see below) and directly before the
experimental testing to make certain the clinical phenomena
were present during the experimental assessment.
Using these methods, we identified seven right brain
injured patients with AHP and DSO (AHP þ DSO group; 4
women; mean age ± SD: 67.6 ± 12.5 years, range 41e78; mean
education ± SD: 11.7 ± 1.9 years, range 9e14; mean lesion e
test interval ± SD: 7.4 ± 5.6 days, range 1e16), nine right brain
injured patients with AHP, but without DSO (AHP group; 6
women; mean age ± SD: 70.6 ± 16.5 years, range 36e88; mean
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test interval ± SD: 14.7 ± 11.6 days, range 4e35), and fifteen
right brain injured control patients without AHP or DSO (HP
group; 6 women; mean age ± SD: 66.9 ± 13.1 years, range
47e88; mean education ± SD: 12.6 ± 2.6 years, range 9e18;
mean lesione test interval ± SD: 17.5 ± 14.1 days, range 3e42).
All patients were right handed according to the Edinburgh
inventory (Oldfield, 1971), except one ambidextrous control
patient. All participants provided written informed consent
and the study was approved by the local NHS Ethics
committee.
2.2. Clinical and cognitive assessment
In addition to the DSO and AHP scales, each patient under-
went a standard neurological and neuropsychological exam-
ination. Motor deficits of the upper and the lower limbs were
assessed using the Medical Research Council scale (MRC;
Guarantors of Brain, 1986). Proprioception was assessed with
eyes closed by applying a small vertical movement to three
joints (middle finger, wrist and elbow), at three time intervals,
according to a method previously described (Vocat, Staub,
Stroppini, & Vuilleumier, 2010), scored on a 10-point scale
(0 ¼ severe proprioceptive deficit; 9 ¼ no deficit). The
customary ‘confrontation’ technique (Bisiach, Vallar, Perani,
Papagno, & Berti, 1986) was administered to test visual fields
(upper and lower quadrants) and tactile extinction (upper and
lower limbs).
Patients were also assessed using the following stand-
ardised tests: (a) the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE;
Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) and the Montreal Cogni-
tive Assessment (MoCA; Nasreddine et al., 2005) as a measure
of global intellectual ability, as well as the Wechsler Test of
Adult Reading (Wechsler, 2001) as a measure of premorbid
intelligence; (b) the 5-item test from the MoCA (Nasreddine
et al., 2005) to assess long-term verbal recall and the verbal
digit-span task from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III
(Wechsler, 1998) to assess verbal working memory; (c) five
subtests of the Behavioural Inattention Test (BIT; Wilson,
Cockburn, & Halligan, 1987; star cancellation, line bisection,
line crossing, copy, and representational drawing of the clock)
as a measure of visuospatial neglect, as well as the ‘One-item
test’ (Bisiach et al., 1986) and the ‘Comb/razor test’ (McIntosh,
Brodie, Beschin,& Roberston, 2000) to assess personal neglect;
(d) a clinical assessment of left/right disorientation was
additional conducted; (e) the Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB;
Dubois, Slachevsky, Litvan, & Pillon, 2000) and the Cognitive
Estimates test (Shallice & Evans, 1978) to assess executive and
reasoning abilities; and (f) the Hospital Anxiety and Depres-
sion Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) to assess anxiety
and depression.
2.3. Experimental study design
The main experiment assessed whether visual capture of a
visible, motionless rubber hand influenced body ownership
(VOC) in three groups of patients: AHP versus AHP þ DSO
versus HP. There were two rubber hand ownership questions:
“Is this [pointing to the rubber hand] your left hand?” (YES/NO
response) and “To what extent do you feel this is your left hand?”(scale out of 10; not at all ¼ 0, completely ¼ 10). The YES/NO
ownership answers were analysed qualitatively only, while
the ownership answers based on the scale were used as our
primary dependent variable VOC and analysed quantitatively
in both behavioural and lesion comparisons. Subsequently, to
test the strength of the effect, patients were instructed to try
to move their left hand and we provided congruent visual
feedback of rubber hand movement by moving it according to
the instruction (as in Fotopoulou et al., 2008). The same two
rubber hand ownership questions were repeated and an
‘Ownership Change’ score was calculated as the difference
between the ownership scores before and after themovement
of the rubber hand by the experimenter.
2.4. Materials and procedure
A life-sized rubber model of a left hand was used to create
visual capture. A suitable rubber hand was selected for each
patient in order to resemble their own real hand in terms of
size, shape, and skin tone. The procedure of the experiment
was similar to the one used by Fotopoulou et al. (2008) as
follows. Patients were tested on the stroke ward while sitting
upright in their bed or a comfortable chair. At the beginning
of the experiment, the main experimenter distracted the
patient's attention with general questions (e.g., about past
history), and an assisting experimenter sat to the left and
slightly behind the patient, holding the proximal end of the
rubber hand covered by a pillow. While the patient was
distracted, the assisting experimenter placed the rubber hand
on a second pillow in front of the patient close to their
midline, such that the distal end of the rubber hand could be
seen protruding from in between the two pillows, in a natural
(canonical) position and orientation (Fig. 1). The patient's own
left hand was positioned out of sight beneath the pillow and
the rubber hand, also at the patient's midline (i.e., at the
same orientation as the rubber hand). Once the rubber hand
was in position, the main experimenter instructed the pa-
tient to look at the hand (i.e., the rubber hand) in front of
them for 15 sec and then tested for ownership of the rubber
hand as described above (i.e., visual capture effect). Any
spontaneous comments or relevant behaviours were noted
by the examiner.
In the movement condition, the main experimenter asked
the patient to slightly raise his/her left hand immediately
following a tap on a table in front of them, and the assisting
experimenter lifted the rubber hand accordingly. Immediately
after the visual feedback ofmovement, patients had to answer
the rubber hand ownership questions described above, as well
as a question serving as a manipulation check, namely a
movement detection question (“Did the arm move?” YES/NO
response). Owning to paralysis (see inclusion criteria), there
was of course nomovement of the patient's actual left hand in
any conditions. After the experiment, patients were debriefed
to explain the aim of the experiment and any questions were
addressed.
2.5. Statistical analysis
All analyses were conducted using STATISTICA 7.1 software.
Preliminary checks via visual inspection of histograms and
Fig. 1 e Schematic representation of experimental set-up. The patient was tested at the bedside, with the assistant
experimenter sitting to the left and slightly behind the patient. The experimenter distracted the patient by asking a series of
general questions (e.g., about past history), while the assistant experimenter (1) positioned the patients real left hand out of
sight beneath a pillow; and (2) placed the rubber hand beneath a second pillow, so that the distal end of the rubber hand
could be seen protruding from the pillow. The assistant experimenter held the proximal end of the rubber hand covered by
the pillow, allowing them to move the rubber hand when necessary.
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normally distributed in the majority of cases (p < .05).
Therefore, we performed group analyses on the epidemio-
logic data, standardised neuropsychological tests, the
experimental measures of VOC, and a correlational analysis
based on our prediction regarding the relation between VOC
and proprioceptive deficits, using non-parametric tests and
corrections for multiple comparisons, as appropriate
(detailed below).
2.6. Lesion analysis methods
The location and extent of brain lesions was mapped in
each patient, based on a CT-scan (or a 1.5T MRI-scan for 5
patients) obtained within the first week of admission. The
scans of three hemiplegic patients (in the HP group) were
unavailable and these patients were therefore excluded
from further imaging analyses. The native structural scan of
each patient was not normalised, but reoriented and aligned
to match the stereotaxic space of the T1-weighted MRI scan
template from the MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute),
provided within the MRIcron software (http://www.
mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron/; Rorden & Brett,
2000). The quality of normalisation when working with a
sample such as ours of elderly stroke patients presents a
range of problems (e.g., larger ventricles) and can greatly
disrupt the normalisation process leading to inaccurate
spatial normalisation (Brett, Leff, Rorden, & Ashburner,
2001; Rorden & Karnath, 2004). Although techniques have
been introduced to help improve the accuracy of automated
spatial normalisation of individuals with brain injury (see
Brett et al., 2001), the quality and accuracy of the normal-
isation is still compromised, with the lesion location often
shifting during the normalisation process. Therefore,manual lesion demarcation using a normalised brain tem-
plate is often considered as the preferred method, as it more
accurately identifies the lesion location, especially in cases
of older patients with brain injury (Rorden & Karnath, 2004).
Thus, all the lesions were drawn onto the MNI template,
whilst using all available scans to guide the delineation, by a
researcher (SB) who was blind to the patient grouping and
hypothesis of the study. Percentage lesion overlay maps for
the three groups, AHP, AHP þ DSO, and HP, were computed
and lesion volume was obtained.
The VLSM approach (Bates et al., 2003) identifies voxels
significantly associated with a cognitive deficit in a group of
patients, and involves running a t-test for continuous data,
comparing patients' scores on a neuropsychological test in
those patients with versus without a lesion at every voxel.
This technique as implemented in the software package NPM
(non-parametric mapping; http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.
edu/mricro/npm/; Rorden, Karnath, & Bonilha, 2007) was
used to identify anatomical regions associated with (1) the
baseline sense of body ownership using a binomial classifi-
cation (0 ¼ DSO, 1 ¼ normal) based on the Cutting question-
naire (Cutting, 1978) N ¼ 28); (2) Proprioceptive deficits, using
the scale out of 9, in the three groups (N ¼ 28); (3) Visual
Capture of Ownership, using the 11-point scale, in the three
groups (N¼ 28); (4) Failures in the Visual Capture of Ownership
using the reversed 11-point scale in the three groups (N ¼ 28).
The analyses were restricted to the voxels in which at least
two patients had lesions (8% and 13% of the sample, respec-
tively). Owing to the relatively small sample size, results were
calculated with the permutated non-parametric Bru¨n-
neleMenzel test to correct for multiple comparison and small
sample size (Rorden et al., 2007). Permutation testing is
appropriate here because it preserves power, relative to Bon-
ferroni correction (Rorden et al., 2007).
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3.1. Demographic, diagnostic and neuropsychological
results
Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics (age, educa-
tion, gender and delay between stroke and assessment) and
the neuropsychological performances of the three groups. As
expected, AHP þ DSO showed more DSO than both other
groups, namely AHP and HP (Z ¼ 3.3 and 3.7 respectively,
p's < .001), as tested by the modified Cutting questionnaire.
Similarly, ManneWhitney U tests revealed that AHP (Z ¼ 3.9
and 4 respectively, p's < .001) and AHP þ DSO (Z ¼ 3.6 and 3.7
respectively, p's < .001) were significantly worse than HP on
the Berti and Feinberg scales.
KruskaleWallis testsrevealedthat thedelay,ageandeduca-
tionaldifferencesbetweenthethreegroups(AHP,AHPþDSOand
HP)werenotsignificant(p's>.1).AllthreegroupsshowedasimilarTable 1 e Demographic characteristics and neuropsychological
AHP
n Mean SD n
Age (years) 9 70.56 16.48 7
Education (years) 9 11.78 2.17 7
Male/female 9 3/6 e 7
Days from onset 9 14.67 11.6 7
Berti awareness 9 1.67 .5 7
Feinberg awareness 9 6.33 2.03 7
Self-body ownership 9 0 0 7
MMSE 6 22.17 5.49 3
MoCA 5-item 9 3.89 .93 6
WTAR 6 36.5 9.2 4
Digit span Forwards 9 5.78 .97 7
Digit span Backwards 9 2.89 .93 7
L/R disorientation 9 11.56 2.19 6
Comb/Razor test L 9 4.67 4 7
Comb/Razor test R 9 12.56 5.66 7
Comb/Razor test ambiguous 9 5.33 2.6 7
Comb/Razor test bias 9 .33 .29 7
One item test 9 .67 .5 7
Star Cancellation omission L 9 21.44 10.34 7
Star Cancellation omission R 9 15.33 4.97 7
Line crossing L 9 .22 .44 7
Line crossing centre 9 .33 .5 7
Line crossing R 9 .22 .44 7
Line cancellation L 9 4 6.71 7
Line cancellation R 9 11.22 6.55 7
Copy BIT 9 .33 .5 7
Drawing (clock) 9 .11 .33 7
FAB 7 10.57 1.99 3
Cognitive estimates 8 16.25 4.53 4
HADS anxiety 9 6.33 4.09 5
HADS depression 9 4.89 4.11 5
NS ¼ not significant for all comparisons (with post-hoc Bonferroni correc
* Significant differences between the AHP and the HP groups, p < .017.
y Significant differences between the AHP and the AHP þ DSO groups, p <
♯ Significant differences between the AHP þ DSO and the HP groups, p <
AHP ¼ Anosognosia for hemiplegia; DSO ¼ Disturbed sensation of lim
SD ¼ standard deviation; MMSE ¼ Mini Mental State Examination; MOCA
Reading; L ¼ left; R ¼ right; BIT ¼ Behavioural Inattention Test; FAB ¼ Fr
scale.profileofneuropsychologicalimpairmentsinglobalintellectual
ability,memory,executive functionsandmood,withnosignifi-
cantdifferencesbetweengroups(p's> .05;seeTable1).However,
KruskaleWallis tests revealed significant differences between
the three groups in personal neglect [c2(2)¼ 7.4, p¼ .02], visuo-
spatialneglect(seeTable1),andatrendeffectintheclockdrawing
task [c2(2) ¼ 6.1, p ¼ .05]. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests
indicatedthatAHPandAHPþDSOpatientsshowedsignificantly
greatervisuospatial(butnotpersonal)neglectcomparedwithHP
(seeTable1).PerformanceoftheAHPandAHPþDSOpatientswas
equivalent (p's > .017). The groups also differed significantly in
proprioception[c2(2)¼12.7,p¼.002],butnotintactileextinctionon
the left side, especially on the left upper limb (p's> .1). Post-hoc
comparisons were carried out using ManneWhitney U tests
(Bonferroni-correctedcriticala¼ .017).Therewasnodifference
betweentheAHP(mean¼4.3±2.5)andAHPþDSO(mean¼4.1±1.7)
groups (p¼ .84), butbothweremore impairedthantheHPgroup
(mean¼7.4±1;Z¼2.3,p¼.017andZ¼3.2,p¼.0004,respectively).findings in 31 patients.
AHP þ DSO HP p
Mean SD n Mean SD
67.57 12.55 15 66.93 13.11 NS
11.71 1.89 15 12.6 2.59 NS
2/5 e 15 10/5 e e
7.43 5.56 15 17.47 14.12 NS
1.86 .38 15 .07 .26 *,♯
7.14 1.95 15 .36 .72 *,♯
2 0 15 0 0 y,♯
24.67 4.93 3 26.67 2.31 NS
4 .89 10 4.2 1.62 NS
34.5 14.08 5 34 6.63 NS
6.14 .69 12 6.25 1.29 NS
2.86 .9 12 3.33 1.3 NS
9.83 1.83 12 12.42 1.83 NS
3.71 2.81 13 6.38 4.09 NS
14.43 6.88 13 11.61 3.07 NS
8.14 5.3 13 5.69 3.4 NS
.44 .2 13 .24 .24 NS
1.57 .79 15 .73 .8 NS
26.86 .38 13 14.38 12.18 NS
15.14 4.41 13 7.38 6.9 *,♯
.14 .38 15 .6 .51 NS
.29 .49 15 .93 .7 NS
.29 .49 15 .87 .74 NS
3.29 5.06 15 13.6 6.95 *,♯
11.86 4.95 15 15.87 5.15 *
.43 .79 15 1.4 1.18 NS
.29 .49 15 .6 .51 NS
12 1.73 10 13.7 2.63 NS
18.5 5.2 7 12.43 4.35 NS
8.6 4.77 10 8.1 5.78 NS
6 2.91 10 7.7 3.27 NS
ted ManneWhitney U tests), p > .017.
.017.
.017.
b ownership; HP ¼ Hemiplegic patients; n ¼ number of patients;
¼ MOntreal Cognitive Assessment; WTAR ¼Wechsler Test of Adult
ontal Assessment Battery; HADS ¼ Hospital Anxiety and Depression
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The majority of patients (64.5%) experienced an immediate
feeling that the motionless rubber hand was their own and
responded ‘Yes’ to the initial rubber hand ownership ques-
tion, even in the absence of any tactile stimulation or move-
ment. Specifically, 6/7 patients in the AHP þ DSO group (86%),
6/9 patients in the AHP group (67%), and 8/15 patients in theHP
group (53%) experienced ownership of the rubber hand from
visual capture alone. Although these percentages were higher
in the two groups with delusions compared with the control
group, a KruskaleWallis test showed that there were no sig-
nificant differences between the three groups in VOC using
the 11-point scale measure described above [c2(2) ¼ 1.5,
p ¼ .47]. Additionally, no significant differences between the
three groups were found on ‘Movement Ownership Change’
scores [c2(2) ¼ 1.1, p ¼ .6], as expected from the fact that only
two out of 31 patients changed their responses, with 6/7 pa-
tients in the AHP þ DSO group (86%), 7/9 patients in the AHP
group (77.8%), and 7/15 patients in the HP group (46.7%)
experienced ownership of the rubber hand following the
movement condition. Moreover, all AHP þ DSO patients, all
but one of the AHP patients and the majority (11/15, 73.3%) of
the HP patients noticed the rubber hand movement during
this condition.
Using the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, we
found a significant negative correlation between visual cap-
ture of ownership and the proprioception scores in the three
groups together (r ¼ .47, p ¼ .02). This correlation remains
significant in the AHPþDSO group alone (r¼.85, p¼ .03), but
not for the other two groups (p's > .05), indicating that greater
proprioceptive impairment was associated with greater rub-
ber hand ownership, particularly in the group with body
ownership delusions.Fig. 2 e Group-level lesion overlay maps in MNI space for A. pa
patients with AHP and disturbed sensation of limb ownership (
The number of overlapping lesions is illustrated by colour, from3.3. Lesion analysis
All lesions resulted from a first-ever unilateral stroke within
the right middle cerebral artery territory. Group-level lesion
overlay maps for the AHP group (n ¼ 9), AHP þ DSO group
(n¼ 7) and HP group (n¼ 12) are illustrated in Fig. 2AeC. Lesion
volume (i.e., total number of voxels) was not significantly
different between the group who experienced ownership of
the rubber hand (VOC) (n ¼ 17, mean ¼ 66068 ± 59666) and the
group who did not (n ¼ 11, mean ¼ 40224 ± 49637, p ¼ .06).
VLSM analysis, looking at brain areas associated with VOC
(Fig. 3B), identified significant voxels (p < .05) involving the
right superior temporal gyrus (STG) in the anterior part, the
frontal operculum (fOp), the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and
the supramarginal gyrus (SMG). By contrast, VLSM analysis,
looking at brain areas associated with greater VOC failure
(Fig. 4), identified significant voxels (p < .05) involving the
posterior part of the insula (pIns), a small area of the putamen
(Put), and the posterior limb of the internal capsule.
Furthermore, VLSM analysis, looking at brain areas asso-
ciated with greater proprioceptive deficit (Fig. 3C), identified
significant voxels (p < .05) involving the right superior tem-
poral gyrus (STG) in the anterior part, the pallidum (Pal), the
insula (Ins), and the somatosensory cortex, primary (SI) and
secondary (SII). Finally, lesion volume (i.e., total number of
voxels) was not significantly different between the
AHP þ DSO group (n ¼ 7, mean ¼ 85087 ± 60320) and the group
without DSO (AHP and HP groups; n ¼ 21,
mean ¼ 46191 ± 53050, p ¼ .09). VLSM analysis, looking at
brain areas associated with worse performance on the DSO
assessment (Fig. 3A), identified significant voxels (p < .05)
involving the right superior temporal gyrus (STG), the TPJ, the
middle frontal gyrus (MFG) and the supramarginal gyrus
(SMG).tients with anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP; n ¼ 9), B.
AHP þ DSO; n ¼ 7), and C. hemiplegic patients (HP; n ¼ 12).
dark red (n ¼ 2) to white (n ¼ 11). L ¼ left; R ¼ right.
Fig. 3 e Voxel-based lesion-symptommapping. A. Damaged MNI voxels predicting a disturbed sensation of limb ownership
(DSO) at the baseline in the 3 groups (n ¼ 28), p < .05 for Z > 1.6449. B. Damaged MNI voxels predicting the illusory
ownership of the rubber hand in the 3 groups (n ¼ 28), p < .05 for Z > 1.6449. C. Damaged MNI voxels predicting a
proprioceptive deficit in the 3 groups (n ¼ 24), p < .05 for Z > 1.6449. L ¼ left; R ¼ right; STG ¼ superior temporal gyrus;
TPJ ¼ temporoparietal junction; SMG ¼ supramarginal gyrus; MFG ¼ middle frontal gyrus; fOp ¼ frontal operculum;
IFG ¼ inferior frontal gyrus; pal ¼ pallidum; Ins ¼ insula; SII ¼ secondary somatosensory cortex; SI ¼ primary
somatosensory cortex.
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The majority of our patients with damage to the right hemi-
sphere (64.5% overall and up to 86% of the patients with DSO
experienced strong feelings of ownership over a motionless
rubber hand just seconds after seeing it and without any
tactile stimulation VOC, in accordance with previous reports
(Fotopoulou et al., 2008). Moreover, VOC was maintained evenFig. 4 e Voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping. Damaged MNI v
in the 3 groups (n ¼ 28), p < .05 for Z > 1.6449. L ¼ left; R ¼ rig
pIC ¼ posterior limb of the internal capsule.when the rubber hand was moved in space by the experi-
menter. In the few studies on healthy controls that have
tested similar ‘mere vision’ conditions, the percentage of
people experiencing VOC tends to bemuch lower (Guimmarra
et al., 2010; Longo et al., 2008; see also Rohde et al., 2011 for
anecdotal evidence). Indeed, in previous published
(Crucianelli, Metcalf, Fotopoulou, & Jenkinson, 2013) and un-
published data (Crucianelli et al., in preparation) from ouroxels predicting no illusory ownership of the rubber hand
ht; pIns ¼ posterior part of the insula; put ¼ putamen;
c o r t e x 8 7 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 7 4e1 8 5182group, we found that VOC occurred in 13/70 (18%) of healthy
individuals. However, VOC tends to increase in virtual reality
paradigms that can achieve spatial coincidence between vi-
sual and proprioceptive cues rather than mere spatial con-
gruency and plausibility (Maselli & Slater, 2013; see also
Kilteni et al., 2015 for review). Our data are consistent with
these findings, in that we found a positive association be-
tween proprioceptive deficits and VOC across our patient
groups and particularly in the DSO group. Thus, taken
together, these results suggest that when information from
proprioception is not available due to damage, or it is not
informative (e.g., there is no mismatch in the spatial location
of the seen and felt body parts), visual cues from a realistic
body part can be sufficient to generate not only recalibration
of hand position (Holmes & Spence, 2006 for review), but also
feelings of fake hand ownership.
In our patients, this pathologically exaggerated VOC effect
occurred when proprioception was impaired by lesions to
areas including the primary and secondary somatosensory
cortex (see Fig. 3C). However, it also appears that such
damage is not sufficient for the pathological VOC effect, as
lesions to cortical areas further up the neurocognitive hier-
archy were selectively associated with the VOC effect. Spe-
cifically, VOC scores were primarily associated with lesions to
the frontal operculum and the inferior frontal gyrus, and to a
lesser degree parietal areas (see Fig. 3B). Interestingly, in
functional imaging studies on the RHI, the onset of subjective
feelings of ownership for the fake hand and its vividness
correlated with activation of similar areas in the frontal
operculum and the premotor cortex (Ehrsson et al., 2004,
2005). Thus, when damage to the central, parietal represen-
tation of proprioceptive signals is also accompanied by
damage to such frontal areas, there is a pathological domi-
nance of vision over proprioception and body ownership
feelings of the rubber hand.
By contrast, failures of VOC were associated mostly with
subcortical lesions (see also Zeller et al., 2011) and with the
posterior part of the insula. We had expected this area to be
instead associated by greater pathological VOC in our patients
as in the case of frontal operculum, given the association of
both of these areas with feelings of ownership during the
classic conditions of the RHI (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris
et al., 2007). The fact that neurological patients can present
with both deficits in body ownership (failures of VOC) and
pathological exaggerations of such feelings (VOC), however,
suggests a potential separation between the role of these two
areas in body ownership. The frontal operculum and the
premotor cortexmay contribute to feelings of body ownership
by monitoring mismatches in multisensory integration in a
forward way, i.e., in a way analogous to how efferent motor
signals (Berti et al., 2005; Frith, Blakemore,&Wolpert, 2000) or,
proprioceptive predictions (Fotopoulou, 2015) dominatemotor
awareness in AHP due to the selective involvement of these
areas (see Berti et al., 2005; Fotopoulou, Pernigo, Maeda, Rudd,
& Kopelman, 2010). By contrast, the posterior insular cortex
may instead be related to more fundamental aspects of the
sense of ownership, integrating and monitoring different as-
pects of somatosensation, including interoceptive modalities
(Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004). Howev-
er, further specification of this rolewould be speculative basedon the current data, particularly given the small number of
patients in this analysis and the intrinsic limitations of lesion
analyses as regards this area (Kodumuri et al., 2016).
Although patients with DSO had more proprioceptive def-
icits than control patients, and showed more VOC than the
control group, the latter difference was not statistically sig-
nificant. Interestingly, as mentioned in the introduction, it
remains paradoxical why patients with DSO would deny the
ownership of their own arm when they see it, while they are
willing to accept as theirs a realistic, congruently placed, fake
hand. Indeed, our lesion analyses reveals a dissociation be-
tween pathological VOC and DSO, with the latter being selec-
tively associated with more posterior lesions, including the
right temporoparietal junction and a large area of the supra-
marginal gyrus, and to a lesser degree themiddle frontal gyrus
(see Fig. 3A). Lesions of the right middle frontal gyrus have
previously been correlated with somatoparaphrenia (Feinberg
& Venneri, 2014; Gandola et al., 2012). Interestingly, regions
close to the medial frontal cortex have also been involved in
several self-related functions, such as the sense of an inte-
grated self and the differentiation between the self and the
external world (Feinberg, 2013). In our study, the frontal
network differs between the sense of body ownership and the
rubber hand ownership, involving more the middle frontal
gyrus for the former (Fig. 3A), and the inferior frontal gyrus for
the latter (Fig. 3B). The contribution of the right temporopar-
ietal junction (including the supramarginal gyrus) in body
ownership has been recognised as an early ‘test-of-fit mech-
anism (Tsakiris, 2010), comparing expectations about the state
of the body, with current sensory events. One possibility is
therefore that information about the affected arm from a
modality other than vision (as it is their own hand they are
visually not recognising) is generating error signals that
cannot be predicted by existing top-down, expectations of
selfhood (for the wider theoretical context of this hypothesis
see Fotopoulou, 2015). We have not been able to test the
various candidate modalities in this study, and hence we
merely put forward some possible hypotheses for further ex-
amination. Although the role of defective proprioception is
unlikely to be sufficient to explain DSO (asmany patients with
proprioceptive deficits do not show DSO), and in the present
study many patients with proprioceptive deficits where likely
to feel ownership for a rubber hand placed congruently with
their own, it remains possible that patients with DSO are un-
able to generate appropriate proprioceptive predictions about
their own arm and these affect their ownership. For example,
theymayexperience their ownarm tobe in a different position
than the one tested and hence they may deny its ownership
when they are asked to look at this familiar arm (rather than a
rubber hand) in a different position. More generally, a recent
RHI study in paralysed patients has argued that any alteration
of the normal flow of signals present during movements may
affect feelings of body ownership (Burin et al., 2015). In addi-
tion, although the rubber hand was placed in a position
congruent and similar to the patients’ own arms, it remains
possible, particularly given the frequent deficits in personal
neglect in DSO patients, that patients deny an arm they see in
personal space (i.e., their own arm) more often than an arm
they see in proximity but in peripersonal space (i.e., the rubber
hand). Finally, although we did not find any evidence for this
c o r t e x 8 7 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 7 4e1 8 5 183hypothesis based on limited bedside assessments of tactile
extinction in the current study, a candidatemodalitywould be
somatosensation, including exteroceptive (tactile perception
impairment or hypoesthesia) and interoceptive variants (e.g.,
pain). Despite their DSO, patients are known to complain of
left arm ‘heaviness’, ‘numbness’, ‘coldness’ and other similar
sensations. It is thus possible that damage to the rTPJ, does not
allow these new sensations to be integrated in patients' body
representation. This hypothesis would need to be tested in
future studies, but it is compatible with anecdotal evidence in
the field, as captured by this quote from the existing literature;
“I know they [left arm and leg] look like mine, but I can feel
they are not, and I can't believe my eyes” (C. W. Olson, 1937,
cited in Feinberg, 2001).
4.1. Limitations and future directions
The current study has shown that a fake hand can capture
ownership in patients with right-hemisphere damage. How-
ever, future studies should manipulate the visuo-semantic
and visuo-spatial properties of the presented hand in order
to establish the constraints of this phenomenon (see Tsakiris,
2010; Kilteni et al., 2015 for discussions). Measurements and
manipulations of exteroceptive and interoceptive domains of
contralateral somatosensation can further add specificity to
our neuroanatomical findings. Moreover, although we did not
find significant differences in VOC between our three groups,
larger samples are necessary to exclude a relationship be-
tween VOC and somatic delusions. Moreover, such future
studies with larger samples could investigate such factors in
groups fully balanced for neuropsychological performance, or
with statistical tests allowing for co-variation of various
neuropsychological functions that was not possible in the
current study. For instance, our lesions analysis included ac-
tivations in the anterior region of the right superior temporal
gyrus that have been elicited in visual-orienting and alertness
tasks (Sturm & Willmes, 2001), demonstrating a general
attention function rather than a specific role in terms of self-
processing (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014). Actually, the same region
of the right superior temporal gyrus was found in our three
lesion analyses (Fig. 3). Furthermore, future studies should
include a left-hemisphere damage patient group allowing for
greater interpretation regarding laterality.
Lastly, it is important to recognise that interpretation of the
neuroanatomical correlates are limited by our relatively small
sample size and inherit limitations to our lesion mapping
approach (Geva,Baron, Jones, Price,&Warburton, 2012;Rorden
et al., 2007). Our interpretations do not take into account the
structural and functional connectivity between areas and
related functional networks. Contrary to some functional
neuroimaging methods, current voxel-based lesion analyses
methods also do not allow for correlations between function
andneural activity at thewhole brain level. Instead, they focus
on themost frequently lesioned voxels in a sample of patients
with behavioural deficits. This has the advantage of pointing
to certain areas that may have a necessary functional role in
a network, but it does not tell us much more about that
network and its connections. In addition, lesion analyses
methods are limited by the fact that certain areas may simply
be more frequently damaged following certain types of stroke(tKodumuri et al., 2016). Nevertheless, all previous lesion
mapping studies in such disorders are subject to comparable
limitations, with our study being one of the few that has
directly compared experimental scores with lesion data.
Future studieswill have to use better structural lesiondata and
functional MRI paradigms to be able to more accurately iden-
tify brain areas and importantly alsowhitematter connections
related to VOC and somatic delusions of ownership.5. Conclusion
Overall, the present data highlight three important findings.
First, the majority of patients with right perisylvian fissure
lesions experience feelings of ownership over a rubber hand,
without any tactile stimulation. Second, this ‘visual capture of
ownership’ is associated with proprioceptive deficits and le-
sionsmostly in the frontal operculumand the premotormotor
cortex. Third, this mechanism seems behaviourally and
neurally dissociated from the feelings of disownership expe-
rienced by somatoparaphrenic patients. It seems that in the
latter patients, feelings of disownership dominate vision in
the case of their own arm,while vision dominates their feeling
of ownership in the case of others arms.Funding
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